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ARE WE THERE YET?: GATEKEEPERS, DA UBERT, AND AN ANALYSIS OF
STATE V. WHITE
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2009, the South Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. White (White
JJ),1 clarified the law regarding the admissibility of expert witness testimony in
state courts.2 Specifically, the court reinforced the notion that state court judges
must act as "gatekeepers" to determine whether the testimony of expert
witnesses, including the testimony of scientific and nonscientific experts, is
reliable.3 This decision clarified a decision of the South Carolina Court of
Appeals, which had held that the question of reliability of a nonscientific expert
witness's testimony was an issue for the jury to decide.
However, in White II and in other cases, the South Carolina Supreme Court
has repeatedly refused to adopt explicitly a version of the federal standard,
expressed by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
5 6Inc., used to determine the admissibility of expert witness testimony. Instead,
1. 382 S.C. 265, 676 S.E.2d 684 (2009).
2. Id. at 272-74, 676 S.E.2d at 687-89.
3. Id. at 270, 676 S.E.2d at 686.
4. See State v. White (White 1), 372 S.C. 364, 384, 642 S.E.2d 607, 617 (Ct. App. 2007),
aff'd on other grounds, 382 S.C. 265, 676 S.E.2d 684 (2009).
5. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Court's decision in Daubert was based on its interpretation of
former Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See id. at 587-88. At the time Daubert was
decided, Federal Rule 702 read, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." FED. R. Evir. 702 (1988) (amended 2000). The current South Carolina Rule
702 copies verbatim the language of the old federal rule. See S.C. R. EVIE. 702. The amended
Federal Rule 702 reflects the Supreme Court's holding in Daubert and states as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVnD. 702.
6. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 383 S.C. 535, 548 n.5, 681 S.E.2d 580, 587 n.5 (2009) (refusing
to adopt Daubert); State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 20, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (1999) (same). The court
in White II makes no reference to the Daubert standard. See White 11, 382 S.C. 265, 676 S.E.2d 684.
Currently, thirty states have adopted or applied the Daubert standard to determine whether to admit
a witness to testify as an expert in a given field. See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska
1999); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark. v. Foote, 14 S.W.3d 512, 519 (Ark. 2000); People v.
Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 78 (Colo. 2001); State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 742 (Conn. 1997); Nelson v.
State, 628 A.2d 69, 73-74 (Del. 1993); Agri-Cycle LLC v. Couch, 663 S.E.2d 175, 179 (Ga. 2008);
State v. Escobido-Ortiz, 126 P.3d 402, 410 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Vliet, 19 P.3d 42,
53 (Haw. 2001)); State v. Parkinson, 909 P.2d 647, 652 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996); Kempf Contracting
& Design, Inc. v. Holland-Tucker, 892 N.E.2d 672, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Shafer &
Freeman Lakes Envtl. Conservation Corp. v. Stichnoth, 877 N.E.2d 475, 484 (hid. Ct. App. 2007));
Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 531 (Iowa 1999); Burton v. CSX Transp.,
1
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South Carolina has insisted on following its own courts' interpretation of South
Carolina Rules of Evidence Rule 7027 and South Carolina's common law rule.8
Thus, after White II, questions still remain: What is the effect of the court's
decision in White II, and has the court gone far enough to ensure that state trial
judges play a meaningful role in determining the admissibility of expert
witnesses?
Part II of this Note will discuss the details of Daubert and its progeny. Part
III will describe the historical South Carolina approach up to the court's decision
in White II, and Part IV will discuss in detail the court's opinion in White IT
Finally, Part V will discuss the effect that White II will have in South Carolina.
On one hand, the decision emphasizes the important gatekeeping role of trial
judges in determining the admissibility of expert witnesses in state courts. The
court's opinion makes unequivocally clear that trial judges must exercise their
duty as gatekeepers to determine the admissibility of scientific and nonscientific
expert witnesses. However, the decision does not go far enough. Specifically, the
refusal of the court to adopt Daubert explicitly and to provide a procedural
mechanism by which a trial court can thoroughly assess an expert witness's
reliability leaves some to be desired. Thus, because deficiencies still exist in the
area of admissibility of expert testimony, the South Carolina Supreme Court
should take the additional step of explicitly adopting the Daubert standard by
amending the state's rules that address expert witness testimony in order to bring
the state's law in line with federal practice.
Inc., 269 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. 2008) (citing Toyota Motor Corp. v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Ky.
2004)); State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993); State v. MacDonald, 718 A.2d 195, 198-
99 (Me. 1998); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994); Gilbert v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391, 408 (Mich. 2004); Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore,
863 So. 2d 31, 35 (Miss. 2003); State v. Price, 171 P.3d 293, 298 (Mont. 2007) (citing State v.
Cline, 909 P.2d 1171, 1177 (Mont. 1996)) (limiting application of Daubert to novel scientific
evidence); Fickle v. State, 735 N.W.2d 754, 770 (Neb. 2007); State v. Hungerford, 697 A.2d 916,
925 (N.H. 1997); State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 203-04 (N.M. 1993); Miller v. Bike Athletic Co.,
687 N.E.2d 735, 740 (Ohio 1998); Scruggs v. Edwards, 154 P.3d 1257, 1259 (Okla. 2007); State v.
O'Key, 899 P.2d 663, 672 (Or. 1995); State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1355 n.2 (R.I. 1996); State v.
Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482, 484 (S.D. 1994); McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 265
(Tenn. 1997); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995); State
v. Brooks, 643 A.2d 226, 229 (Vt. 1993); Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va. 1993);
Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 443 (Wyo. 1993).
7. S.C. R. EvD. 702.
8. See, e.g., Council, 335 S.C. at 19-20, 515 S.E.2d at 517-18 (citing State v. Jones, 273
S.C. 723, 731, 259 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1979)) (rejecting the Daubert rule in favor of the Jones
common law rule, which is in accord with the state's Rule 702).
[VOL. 61 : 897
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A. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court provided one of the most
important decisions regarding evidentiary proceedings and the admissibility of
expert testimony. The Supreme Court held that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence9 usurped the old rule laid out in Frye v. United Statesl° regarding the
admissibility of expert testimony. 11 Under the Frye rule, expert testimony was
admitted if the methodology the expert used to reach the conclusion was a
generally accepted methodology within the scientific community.
1 2
In Daubert, the Supreme Court found that Rule 702 does not include any
language requiring that an expert's methodology be generally accepted within
the relevant community. 13  Instead, the Court established a broader
requirement-that an expert witness's testimony must be reliable and must assist
the trier of fact.14 The importance of Daubert relates to the reliability prong of
this requirement and the factors set forth by the Supreme Court to determine
reliability.
The issue of reliability of expert testimony requires courts to "determine
whether the proffered opinions satisfy [the factors]. This step ... focuses on the
opinions themselves, rather than the expert's qualifications. 15 The Supreme
Court offered a nonexhaustive list of factors to determine whether an expert's
testimony is reliable, including whether the theory or technique can be tested;
"whether [it] has been subjected to peer review and publication"; whether it has
9. FED. R. EviD. 702 (1988) (amended 2000).
10. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by rule, FED. R. EvID. 702, as
recognized in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-89.
11. Daubert, 509U.S. at587.
12. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. Some states still use the Frye test. See, e.g., State v. Tankersley,
956 P.2d 486, 491 (Ariz. 1998) (rejecting the invitation to adopt the Daubert test and instead
adhering to Frye); Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chesson, 923 A.2d 939, 946 (Md. 2007) (citing
Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (Md. 1978)) (applying Frye). However, the test has been subject
to much scholarly criticism, particularly prior to the Supreme Court's Daubert decision in 1993.
See, e.g., Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative to the Frye
Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545, 562 (1984) ("The Frye test's insistence on general acceptance
is based on the erroneous assumption 'that the scientific community speaks with a single voice on
the acceptance of novel scientific procedures."' (quoting Symposium on Science and the Rules of
Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 221 (1983))).
13. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
14. See id. at 590-91 (discussing the requirements of reliability and relevance under Rule
702); see also United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The touchstones for
admissibility under Daubert are two: reliability and relevancy." (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589,
597)).
15. Fernandez v. Spar Tek Indus., Inc., No. 0:06-3253-CMC, 2008 WL 2185395, at *1
(D.S.C. May 23, 2008); see also TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 325 F.3d 234, 240 (4th Cir. 2003) ("In
applying Daubert, a court evaluates the methodology or reasoning that the proffered scientific or
technical expert uses to reach his conclusion; the court does not evaluate the conclusion itself.").
2010]
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an acceptable rate of error; and whether it has gained general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community.16 No single factor is dispositive. 17 Regarding the
requirement that the testimony must assist the trier of fact, the Court noted that
"[t]his condition goes primarily to relevance"18 and that the "standard requires a
valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to
admissibility."'1 9
The trial judge's role in evidentiary proceedings, specifically in deciding
whether to admit an expert's testimony, was one of the factors considered by the
court in Daubert.20 The Court pointed out that experts are "permitted wide
latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand
knowledge or observation. '21 Furthermore, in certain types of cases, such as
products liability cases, expert testimony is often the "primary tool in deciding
whether a particular product was defective and whether that defect caused the
plaintiff's injury." 22 Thus, a trial judge's decision whether to admit an expert's
testimony into evidence can be outcome determinative.23 Because of the
16. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. While the Supreme Court enumerated these specific factors
to determine reliability, the Court also stressed the importance of flexibility in applying the factors.
Id. at 594.
17. See id. at 593; see also Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248,
261 (4th Cir. 2005) ("As the gatekeeper, the district court should analyze the proposed expert
testimony using several factors .... (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94)).
18. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
19. Id. at 591-92.
20. Id. at 592 (citing FED. R. EVID. 104(a)).
21. Id.; see also Warren Molse, Witch Doctors: Part I (A Mostly Non-Daubert Look at Expert
Witnesses), S.C. LAW., Jan. 2005, at 11, 12 (acknowledging the potential abuses of expert witness
testimony and the "dangers of expert quacks, weird science and raw speculation"). Judge Learned
Hand provided informative insight on the issue of expert testimony:
The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury, not facts, as we have seen, but general
truths derived from his specialized experience. But how can the jury judge between two
statements each founded upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It
is just because they are incompetent for such a task that the expert is necessary at all.
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L.
REv. 40, 54 (1901). Because of the powerful ability of an expert witness to persuade a jury, the trial
judge must act as a guardian to prevent unreliable expert testimony from reaching the jury. See, e.g.,
United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting one of the potential problems
of expert testimony is the danger that the testimony will "assume a posture of mystic infallibility in
the eyes of a jury of laymen"); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
Frye v. United States, a Hal-Century Later, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 1197, 1237 (1980) ("The major
danger of scientific evidence is its potential to mislead the jury; an aura of scientific infallibility
may shroud the evidence and thus lead the jury to accept it without critical scrutiny." (footnote
omitted)).
22. David G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 80 DENV. U. L. REv. 345, 346 (2002); see also
Joel Cooper et al., Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make Decisions?, 20 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 379, 380 (1996) ("In complex litigation, expert witnesses are often the primary
source of substantive evidence in the case.").
23. See, e.g., Ken Suggs, Amendments to the Federal Rules: The Bad Guys Win Again, S.C.
LAW., May/June 2001, at 45, 46 ("The fact is, Daubert and its progeny give absolute license to
judges to keep cases away from juries.").
[VOL. 61 : 897
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heightened role of expert witness testimony, the court's role as a gatekeeper is of
utmost importance.
B. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
After Daubert, the federal courts questioned whether the gatekeeping
function of the trial court applied to technical and other specialized fields or
whether the Supreme Court intended Daubert to be restricted only to scientific
expert testimony. 24 In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,25 the Supreme Court held
that the principles from Daubert also apply to nonscientific knowledge,
26including technical and specialized knowledge. The Court gave two reasons
why Daubert should apply to technical and specialized knowledge. First, it noted
that Rule 702 does not distinguish between scientific expert testimony and other
types of expert testimony. Instead, the Court reasoned that the reliability
requirements from Daubert apply to all forms of "knowledge," including
scientific, technical, and other specialized forms. 28 The Court pointed out that
Daubert stressed that knowledge was the significant requirement of Rule 702
and that the reason Daubert mentioned only scientific expert testimony was that
it had no other type of expert evidence to consider.29 Second, the Court in
Kumho noted the practical problems for the trial court if it had to distinguish
between scientific expert testimony and technical or other specialized expert
testimony because there is no clear line between--or definition of-those
terms.30 Because science is often the basis for technical and other specialized
31fields, confusion could arise in distinguishing the terms.
The Court also emphasized that the factors determining reliability
enumerated in Daubert were not exhaustive and that the Court intended the rule
24. Compare Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 990 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the
argument that Daubert applies only to scientific expert testimony and instead applying the test to
technical expert testimony), and Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 367 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996)
(applying Daubert to determine the admissibility of a technical engineering expert), with United
States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997) (restricting Daubert only to scientific expert
testimony and refusing to apply the rule to specialized knowledge), and Compton v. Subaru of Am.,
Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996) (refusing to apply Daubert to nonscientific expert
testimony and restricting the rule to experts who utilize a principle or methodology), overruled by
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). One court that rejected the use of Daubert
when determining the admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony reasoned that it was
"unwarranted in cases where expert testimony is based solely upon experience or training."
Compton, 82 F.3d at 1518.
25. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
26. Id. at 141.
27. Id. at 147 ("[The] language [of Rule 702] makes no relevant distinction between
'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other specialized' knowledge.").
28. Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993)).
29. Id. at 147-48 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8).
30. Id. at 148.
31. See id. ("Disciplines such as engineering rest upon scientific knowledge.").
2010]
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to be "'flexible."'' 32 The Court noted, "Daubert makes clear that the factors it
mentions do not constitute a 'definitive checklist or test."' 33 The Court also
reasserted the importance of the trial judge's role as a gatekeeper, noting that the
judge's responsibility "is to make certain that an expert, whether basing
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an
expert in the relevant field."34
C. Other Important Daubert Progeny: Joiner and Weisgram
The United States Supreme Court has expanded its holding in Daubert in
two cases besides Kumho. In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,35 the Court
emphasized that an appellate court should review the trial judge's decision
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony with an abuse of discretion
standard of review.36 Highlighting the role of the trial judge as a gatekeeper, the
Court reasoned that appellate courts must give deference to the determinations37
made by trial judges. Because appellate courts must use an abuse of discretion
standard of review, trial judges have wide discretion in making Daubert
rulings.
38
In Weisgram v. Marley Co.,39 the Court held that the plaintiff, whose verdict
was reversed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals because the trial court
relied on expert testimony that should have been excluded under Daubert,
40
41should not be afforded remand to introduce new evidence to shore up his case.
While Weisgram is in many ways an analysis of Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 42 it emphasizes the importance the Court has placed on the
reliability of expert testimony and the burden on litigants to introduce reliable
evidence during trial.4 3 Because litigants are on "notice of the exacting standards
32. Id. at 150 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594).
33. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593). A federal district court in South Carolina has
acknowledged several other factors that Daubert did not expressly list, including "whether the
expert's analysis leaves unexplained analytical gaps and whether the expert has reasonably
accounted for alternative explanations." Nucor Corp. v. Bell, No. 2:06-CV-02972-DCN, 2008 WL
4442571, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 11, 2008).
34. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
35. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
36. Id. at 141, 143.
37. Id. at 142-43. The Court noted that while the Federal Rules of Evidence may allow a
broader range of expert testimony than the former Frye rule, "they leave in place the 'gatekeeper'
role of the trial judge in screening such evidence." Id. at 142.
38. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984).
39. 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
40. Id. at 443.
41. Id. at 455-56.
42. See id. at 443 ("Our decision is guided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 ... .
43. See id. at 455-57 (affirming appellate court's determination that absent expert testimony
the plaintiffs evidence did not support the jury's verdict).
[VOL. 61 : 897
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol61/iss4/10
EVIDENCE LAW
of reliability," they must ensure that they provide the best expert testimony at
trial.44 If a litigant fails to utilize his strongest evidence initially, an appellate
court need not afford the litigant the opportunity to introduce additional evidence
by remanding the case to the trial court but may direct the trial court to enter
judgment.
45
III. THE SOUTH CAROLINA APPROACH
South Carolina's requirements for expert testimony deviate from the
46requirements of the federal courts. The current version of South Carolina's rule
governing the admissibility of expert testimony is the same as former Federal
Rule 702, but South Carolina has not adopted an amendment that reflects the
holding in Daubert.47 Generally, the requirements for experts to testify in South
Carolina courts are easy to satisfy, and "courts allow experts to testify if they are
more qualified in the field than a juror on the subject. '48 To testify as an expert, a
witness does not need to be a professional. 9 Likewise, "[d]efects in an expert
witness' [s] education and experience go to the weight, not the admissibility, of
the expert's testimony. ' '50 Finally, decisions regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony are within the sound discretion of the trial judge.51
The leading case on the requirements in South Carolina for the admissibility
of expert testimony is State v. Council.52 The South Carolina Supreme Court
noted that it has never followed the displaced Frye standard or the current
Daubert standard; 53 instead, South Carolina courts rely on Rule 702 of the South
Carolina Rules of Evidence and the common law rule of State v. Jones54 to
determine reliability.55 According to the Jones standard, the question of
admissibility turns on "'the degree to which the trier of fact must accept, on
faith, scientific hypotheses not capable of proof or disproof in court and not even
44. Id. at 455 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
45. Id. at 444.
46. See, e.g., State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 19-20, 515 S.E.2d 508, 517-18 (1999) (noting that
South Carolina has never expressly adopted the Daubert standard or the Frye rule).
47. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
48. Peterson v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 365 S.C. 391, 399, 618 S.E.2d 903, 907 (2005)
(citing Gooding v. St. Francis Xavier Hosp., 326 S.C. 248, 252-53, 487 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1997)).
49. Gadson v. Mikasa Corp., 368 S.C. 214, 228, 628 S.E.2d 262, 270 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing
Gooding, 326 S.C. at 253, 487 S.E.2d at 598).
50. Peterson, 365 S.C. at 399, 618 S.E.2d at 907 (citing Gooding, 326 S.C. at 253, 487
S.E.2d at 598).
51. Prince v. Associated Petrol. Carriers, 262 S.C. 358, 365, 204 S.E.2d 575, 579 (1974) (per
curiam).
52. 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999).
53. Id. at 19-20, 515 S.E.2d at 517-18.
54. 273 S.C. 723, 731, 259 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1979) (citing People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr.
350, 355-56 (Ct. App. 1975)).
55. Council, 335 S.C. at 19-20, 515 S.E.2d at 517-18.
2010]
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generally accepted outside the courtroom. ,,56 When utilizing the Jones standard,
courts in South Carolina typically look to several factors to determine reliability,
including "(1) the publications and peer review of the technique; (2) prior
application of the method to the type of evidence involved in the case; (3) the
quality control procedures used to ensure reliability; and (4) the consistency of
the method with recognized scientific laws and procedures. 57
The court in Council noted that, before South Carolina adopted Rule 702,58
it had never followed the Frye rule.59 The court stated that the Jones "standard is
more liberal than the Frye standard. 60 Similar to the United States Supreme
Court's analysis in Daubert, the South Carolina Supreme Court found that "the
proper analysis for determining admissibility of scientific evidence is now under
the [South Carolina Rules of Evidence]. 6 1 Thus, like the federal rule, the court
found that South Carolina Rule 702 requires that expert testimony assist the trier
62of fact and be reliable, and that the expert is adequately qualified. However,
instead of determining reliability based on the Daubert factors, the court in
Council held that state courts should follow the Jones factors.
63
A comparison of the Jones factors and the factors from Daubert shows
similarities. Both standards suggest that peer review is an important-though not
required-element of reliability.64 Likewise, both standards stress the importance
of testability, that is, whether the method employed by the expert is capable of65
repetition. However, one significant factor missing from the Jones standard
56. Jones, 273 S.C. at 731, 259 S.E.2d at 124 (citing Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56).
57. Council, 335 S.C. at 19, 515 S.E.2d at 517 (citing State v. Ford, 301 S.C. 485, 488-90,
392 S.E.2d 781, 783-84 (1990)).
58. The predecessor of Rule 702 was Rule 24 of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal
Procedure, S.C. R. CRIM. P. 24 (1990) (repealed 1995), which is identical in language. Council, 335
S.C. at 20, 515 S.E.2d at 518; see also S.C. R. EVID. 702 notes ("The rule is identical to ... former
Rule 24(a) ....").
59. Council, 335 S.C. at 19, 515 S.E.2d at 517.
60. Id.
61. Id. at20, 515 S.E.2d at 518.
62. Id.
63. Id. Analytically, the South Carolina Supreme Court used the same logic as the United
States Supreme Court, compare Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94
(1993) (listing and explaining factors for determining the reliability of an expert's testimony), with
Council, 335 S.C. at 20, 515 S.E.2d at 518 ("When admitting scientific evidence under Rule 702,
SCRE, the trial judge must find the evidence will assist the trier of fact, the expert witness is
qualified, and the underlying science is reliable."), but held that the Jones factors sufficiently
encompass South Carolina's Rule 702, see Council, 335 S.C. at 20, 515 S.E.2d at 518. Thus, the
Daubert factors are not necessary to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. Id.
64. Compare Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (listing peer review as a relevant factor), with
Council, 335 S.C. at 19, 515 S.E.2d at 517 (citing State v. Ford, 301 S.C. 485, 488, 392 S.E.2d 781,
783 (1990)) (same).
65. Compare Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (listing testability as a relevant factor), with Council,
335 S.C. at 19, 515 S.E.2d at 517 (citing Ford, 301 S.C. at 488, 392 S.E.2d at 783) (same).
[VOL. 61 : 897
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol61/iss4/10
EVIDENCE LAW
66that is present in Daubert is general acceptance within the relevant field. This
factor, which was the exclusive factor of the now obsolete Frye standard, 67 is
one that litigants in both Council68 and Jones69 argued but that the South
Carolina Supreme Court discarded as a requirement in Council.
70
Before White II, there was also a question as to whether the Jones factors
apply to nonscientific expert testimony such as technical or other specialized
knowledge. Unlike federal courts after 1999,71 some South Carolina state courts
had distinguished scientific expert testimony from nonscientific expert testimony
and had applied different evidentiary standards for the admissibility of
nonscientific expert testimony. y2 The first South Carolina case to make such a
distinction was State v. Whaley.73 There, the court distinguished the expert
testimony of a psychology professor from testimony of other "scientific" experts,
such as those who testify regarding "DNA test results, blood spatter
interpretation, and bite mark comparisons. ' 4 The court did not apply the Jones
reliability test to the psychology professor's testimony because the testimony
"simply explains how certain aspects of every day experience shown by the
record can affect human perception and memory."-y7 In State v. Douglas
(Douglas 1),76 the South Carolina Court of Appeals stated that the Jones factors
apply only to scientific expert testimony and that if expert testimony does not
fall within the purview of Jones, then questions of reliability "'go only to the
weight, but not admissibility, of the testimony. ,,
77
66. Compare Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (listing general acceptance as a relevant factor), with
Council, 335 S.C. at 19, 515 S.E.2d at 517 (citing Ford, 301 S.C. at 488-90, 392 S.E.2d at 783-84)
(listing the Jones factors, which do not include general acceptance as a relevant factor).
67. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by rule, FED. R.
EVID. 702, as recognized in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-89.
68. Council, 335 S.C. at 19, 515 S.E.2d at 517.
69. State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 731, 259 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1979).
70. Council, 335 S.C. at 19, 515 S.E.2d at 517.
71. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (applying the Daubert
standard to both scientific and nonscientific expert testimony).
72. See, e.g., State v. Whaley, 305 S.C. 138, 141-42, 406 S.E.2d 369, 371-72 (1991)
(distinguishing testimony regarding the psychology of eyewitness identification from DNA test
results, blood spatter interpretation, and bite mark analysis as nonscientific); White I, 372 S.C. 364,
376, 642 S.E.2d 607, 613 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[N]ot all expert testimony is subject to a Jones
analysis." (citing State v. Douglas (Douglas 1), 367 S.C. 498, 509-10, 626 S.E.2d 59, 65 (Ct. App.
2006), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Douglas (Douglas II), 380 S.C. 499, 504, 671 S.E.2d 606,
609 (2009))), aff'd on other grounds, 382 S.C. 265, 676 S.E.2d 684 (2009).
73. 305 S.C. 138, 406 S.E.2d 369 (1991).
74. Id. at 142, 406 S.E.2d at 371.
75. Id. at 142, 406 S.E.2d at 371-72 (citing People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal.
1984), overruled by People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265 (Cal. 2000)).
76. 367 S.C. 498, 626 S.E.2d 59 (Ct. App. 2006), rev 'don other grounds, 380 S.C. 499, 504,
671 S.E.2d 606, 609 (2009).
77. Id. at 510, 626 S.E.2d at 65 (quoting State v. Morgan, 326 S.C. 503, 513, 485 S.E.2d 112,
118 (Ct. App. 1997), overruled by White II, 382 S.C. 265, 273, 676 S.E.2d 684, 688 (2009)).
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The reasoning provided by courts for limiting Jones to scientific expert
testimony is that Jones's narrow purpose was "to prevent the aura of infallibility
which surrounds 'scientific hypotheses not capable of proof or disproof in court
and not even generally accepted outside the courtroom' from misleading the fact
finders. 78 Thus, "a trial court's threshold inquiry is whether the expert's
methods and techniques even fall within Jones's central purpose., 79 According
to this reasoning, the Jones factors apply only to scientific expert testimony
because of the special nature of the testimony. Because of the so-called aura of
infallibility attached to scientific exgert testimony, such testimony should be
particularly safeguarded from jurors.8P
However, this reasoning is problematic. First, as the United States Supreme
Court noted in Kumho, it can be extremely difficult to differentiate between
scientific and nonscientific expert testimony.8 1 It would be difficult, if not
impossible, to create a bright-line test distinguishing these two types of expert
testimony. 2 Second, this reasoning disregards the underlying importance and
role of the trial judge in evidentiary proceedings. In Daubert, the United States
Supreme Court stressed the importance of the gatekeeper function of the trial
judge. 3 This role may be most important with regard to screening scientific
expert testimony because juries give great weight to such testimony. 8 However,
78. White I, 372 S.C. 364, 376, 642 S.E.2d 607, 613 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added)
(quoting Morgan, 326 S.C. at 513, 485 S.E.2d at 117-18), aff'd on other grounds, 382 S.C. 265,
676 S.E.2d 684 (2009).
79. Morgan, 326 S.C. at 513, 485 S.E.2d at 117 (citing State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 731, 259
S.E.2d 120, 124 (1979)).
80. Before White II, there was one South Carolina Supreme Court case that suggested, in
dicta, that the Jones factors apply to the admissibility of nonscientific experts. See Moriarty v.
Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 341 S.C. 320, 331-32, 534 S.E.2d 672, 678 (2000) (referring to
Kumho for the proposition that a trial judge's gatekeeping function applies to both scientific and
nonscientific expert testimony), modified, State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 602 n.14, 606 S.E.2d 475,
482 n.14 (2004).
81. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999) (relying on this argument
to apply Daubert to nonscientific expert testimony). The dictionary definition of engineering
illustrates this point. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 645 (2d ed. 2001)
(defining engineering as '"the art or science of making practical application of the knowledge of
pure sciences").
82. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 148 ("[C]onceptual efforts to distinguish [scientific knowledge
from technical knowledge] are unlikely to produce clear legal lines capable of application in
particular cases.").
83. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
84. See, e.g., Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake ofDaubert: A New Search
for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEx. L. REv. 715, 789 (1994) ("[S]cientific testimony may sway a jury
even when as science it is palpably wrong."); Cooper et al., supra note 22, at 382 ("When the
evidence is scientifically complex, jurors may rely on the credentials of the expert, for example, as a
clue to the validity of his or her testimony rather than trying to process the content of the
message."). Cooper, Bennett, and Sukel conducted an empirical study to analyze the effect that
different witnesses with varying creditability would have on a jury, and they found that jurors were
more likely to be persuaded when an expert had higher credentials. Cooper et al., supra note 22, at
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the underlying purpose of Daubert still applies to other forms of expert
testimony because a jury just as easily can be swayed by a nonscientific expert
witness. Just as a judge plays an important role in determining the admissibility
of evidence based on factors such as credibility, relevance, and prejudice,86 a
judge should play a significant role in determining the admissibility of all expert
testimony based on the expert's reliability.87 The detrimental effect of unreliable
expert testimony is arguably just as great with technical, nonscientific testimony
as it is for scientific testimony.
IV. WHITE II: A CLARIFICATION FROM THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT
In light of the opinion of the South Carolina Court of Appeals in White I that
the issue of reliability of a nonscientific expert witness's testimony goes to the
weight of the evidence as opposed to admissibility," the South Carolina
Supreme Court in White II sought to clarify the law in the state regarding expert
witness testimony.89 The case involved a defendant, Gary White, who was
convicted of armed robbery and kidnapping. 90 The defendant had fled from the
scene of the crime, but the police were able to apprehend him with the assistance
of a K9 unit.91 During trial, the State moved to qualify as an expert witness thepolice officer who, with the assistance of his tracking dog, tracked down and
387 ("[M]ore mock jurors found for the plaintiff when his case was presented with highly complex
arguments by an expert with high credentials ... ").
85. See, e.g., Sunland Constr. Co. v. City of Myrtle Beach, No. 4:05-cv-1227-RBH, 2007
WL 2822509, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 2007) ("The trial judge's gatekeeping function applies not
only to scientific testimony, but to all expert testimony." (citing Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147)). In his
dissent in Douglas II, Justice Pleicones, emphasizing the role of the trial judge as a gatekeeper,
noted that "qualification as an expert clothes the witness with an air of authority that does not attach
to 'ordinary' witnesses." 380 S.C. 499, 506, 671 S.E.2d 606, 610 (2009) (Pleicones, J., dissenting).
Professor Laurence Tribe recalls the trial of Alfred Dreyfus, the nineteenth century Frenchman who
was falsely convicted of treason, as an example of elaborate and complex (and also nonsensical)
testimony by expert mathematicians persuading a jury to convict Dreyfus even though the jury had
no understanding of the evidence. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual
in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329, 1332-34 (1971). Although anecdotal, this example
does illustrate a simple point: it is the aura of expertise, not just science, that has the power to
persuade a jury.
86. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible .... Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible."); S.C. R. EVID. 402 (same); FED. R. EviD. 403 ("[E]vidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... ");
S.C. R. EvID. 403 (same). Under both the Federal Rules of Evidence, FED. R. EvID. 104(a), and the
South Carolina Rules of Evidence, S.C. R. EVID. 104(a), the judge determines admissibility.
87. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 149 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
88. White I, 372 S.C. 364, 376, 642 S.E.2d 607, 613 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Morgan,
326 S.C. 503, 513, 485 S.E.2d 112, 118 (Ct. App. 1997), overruled by White 17, 382 S.C. 265, 273,
676 S.E.2d 684, 688 (2009)), affd on other grounds, 382 S.C. 265, 676 S.E.2d 684.
89. White II, 382 S.C. at 272, 676 S.E.2d at 687-88.
90. Id. at 268, 676 S.E.2d at 685. White and another cohort had robbed a convenience store.
Id. at 267, 676 S.E.2d at 685.
91. Id. at 268, 676 S.E.2d at 685.
2010]
11
Nash: Are We There Yet: Gatekeepers, Daubert, and an Analysis of State
Published by Scholar Commons, 2010
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
apprehended the defendant. 92 The trial court judge qualified the officer "as an
expert in the field of K9 tracking and handling," and the defendant objected to
the testimony, partly on the ground that it was not reliable.93 After a jury
returned a guilty verdict, the defendant appealed.94
The court of appeals affirmed the verdict and concluded that "'[i]f the
expert's opinion does not fall within Jones, questions about the reliability of an
expert's methods go only to the weight, but not admissibility, of the
testimony."'' 95 According to the court in White I, "[a] trial court's threshold
inquiry is whether the expert's methods and techniques even fall within Jones'
central purpose: to prevent the aura of infallibility which surrounds 'scientific
hypotheses."'' 96 Moreover, the court concluded that dog tracking evidence falls
outside the scope of Jones because it is nonscientific expert testimony and thus
that such "evidence is not required to meet the scientific evidence standard
articulated... in Jones."
97
The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the defendant's writ of
certiorari.9 8 Specifically, the court wanted to address the court of appeals's
holding regarding the admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony.99 Although
the court eventually affirmed the defendant's conviction, it rejected the court of
appeals's reasoning regarding nonscientific expert testimony.1° ° Specifically, the
court held that "[a]ll expert testimony must satisfy the Rule 702 criteria, and that
includes the trial court's gatekeeping function in ensuring the proposed expert
testimony meets a reliability threshold for the jury's ultimate consideration."'10 1
Quoting Kumho, the court concluded that Rule 702 of the South Carolina Rules
of Evidence makes "no relevant distinction between scientific knowledge and
technical or other specialized knowledge. 1 °2 Furthermore, the court stressed the
importance of reliability of expert witness testimony, noting that the state's
"jurisprudence is in complete accord."
10 3
92. White I, 372 S.C. at 371, 642 S.E.2d at 610.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 369, 642 S.E.2d at 609.
95. Id. at 376, 642 S.E.2d at 613 (alteration in original) (citing State v. Morgan, 326 S.C.
503, 513, 485 S.E.2d 112, 118 (Ct. App. 1997), overruled by White II, 382 S.C. at 273, 676 S.E.2d
at 688).
96. Id. (citing Morgan, 326 S.C. at 513, 485 S.E.2d at 118).
97. Id. at 387, 642 S.E.2d at 619 (citing State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979)).
98. White II, 382 S.C. at 267, 676 S.E.2d at 685.
99. Id. at 269, 676 S.E.2d at 686 ("Because of the suggestion that an initial determination of
reliability is not part of the trial court's gatekeeping role, we granted White's petition for a writ of
certiorari.").
100. Id. at 270, 676 S.E.2d at 686. The supreme court held that "the trial court properly
discharged its duty in this case." Id. at 271, 676 S.E.2d at 687.
101. Id. at 270, 676 S.E.2d at 686.
102. Id. (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. (citing State v. Jones, 343 S.C. 562, 572, 541 S.E.2d 813, 818 (2001); State v.
Council, 335 S.C. 1, 20, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (1999)).
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As part of its reasoning, the court deemed it necessary to "clarifTy] ... the
analytical framework for the admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony."
10 4
Specifically, the court reinforced the gatekeeping role of trial judges in
determining the admissibility of expert testimony,105 rejected the reasoning of
the court of appeals in White I1, 6 and overruled State v. Morgan,107 a case upon
which the court of appeals in White I relied, to the extent that Morgan suggested
that nonscientific expert testimony did not fall within the Jones framework. 10 8
The court emphasized that "[t]he familiar tenet of evidence law that a continuing
challenge to evidence goes to 'weight, not admissibility' has never been intended
to supplant the gatekeeping role of the trial court in the first instance in assessing
the admissibility of expert testimony, including the threshold determination of
reliability."'109 Thus, the court concluded that "the trial court in the discharge of
its gatekeeping role in determining admissibility must initially answer the always
present threshold question[] of... reliability."
110
V. THE EFFECTS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF WHITE H
A. An Emphasis on the Gatekeeping Function of Trial Judges
The court's decision in White II is important and beneficial to the legal
community in South Carolina because it explicitly emphasizes the gatekeeping
function of the trial judge to determine the admissibility of all expert witness
testimony, including scientific and nonscientific expert testimony. This brings
the law in South Carolina regarding the admissibility of expert testimony in line
with the federal rule to the extent that the federal rule mandates that a trial judge
perform a gatekeeping function to prevent unreliable expert testimony from
reaching the jury. Although the Jones factors are supposed to help prevent
"junk science" from entering the courtroom, before White II courts did not
always apply the factors.1 12 Thus, at the very least, the decision in White II forces
South Carolina trial judges to perform their duties as gatekeepers to prevent all
unreliable expert testimony, both scientific and nonscientific, from reaching the
jury. Moreover, the decision should serve as a caution to litigants in South
104. Id. at 272, 676 S.E.2d at 687-88.
105. See id. at 274, 676 S.E.2d at 688.
106. Id. at 270, 676 S.E.2d at 686.
107. 326 S.C. 503, 485 S.E.2d 112 (Ct. App. 1997), overruled by White II, 382 S.C. at 273,
676 S.E.2d at 688.
108 White II, 382 S.C. at 273, 676 S.E.2d at 688. In a footnote, the court in White II explained
the fallacy of the reasoning in Morgan. See id. at 273 n.6, 676 S.E.2d at 688 n.6.
109. Id. at 273, 676 S.E.2d at 688.
110. Id. at 274, 676 S.E.2d at 688-89.
111. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (emphasizing
the importance of the trial judge's role as a gatekeeper even if it means preventing "the jury from
learning... authentic insights and innovations").
112. See supra text accompanying notes 75-80.
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Carolina courts to ensure that their experts' opinions are well-founded and
reliable.
B. Shortcomings of White II and Proposed Amendments to the Rules
Even though the court's decision in White II emphasizes the gatekeeping
role of the trial judge, the decision comes up short. 113 That is, there are still
important revisions that should be implemented to ensure that expert witness
testimony in South Carolina courts is reliable. Specifically, the South Carolina
Supreme Court should promulgate certain amendments (Amendments),
originally proposed in 2008, to the state rules of evidence and civil procedure
that explicitly adopt the Daubert standard for admissibility of expert
testimony.1 14 Such Amendments would make South Carolina Rule 702 identical
113. Cf S.C. Judicial Dep't, Written Comments Submitted by the Public,
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/whatsnew/ruleChanges/publicComments.pdf (last visited May 16,
2010) (comment of Daniel B. White) ("South Carolina's current expert admissibility standard in
many cases is in fact no standard at all, but rather a license for most expert testimony to be admitted
'for what it's worth."').
114. See S.C. R. EVID. 702 (proposed 2008) ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case."), available at http://www.
judicial.state.sc.us/whatsnew/20080320publicHearingNotice.htm; S.C. R. CIV. P. 16(d), 26(b)(4)(C)
(proposed 2008), available at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/whatsnew/20080320publicHearing
Notice.htm. As of February 2010, the South Carolina Supreme Court has yet to promulgate these
Amendments, which are not the first efforts to adopt Daubert in South Carolina. In 2007, the
General Assembly considered legislation that would have had the same effect as adopting the
Daubert standard. See S. 687, 117th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007). However, such an
approach would have been both problematic and controversial. It is the prerogative of the South
Carolina Supreme Court to promulgate rules of evidence and procedure. See S.C. CONST. art. V,
§ 4A; 19 S.C. JUR. Constitutional Law § 21 (1993) ("[R]ules [of the court] are submitted by the
supreme court to the judiciary committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate; the rules
automatically go into effect unless specifically rejected by a joint resolution."). Had the General
Assembly passed a law that purportedly contravenes the South Carolina Rules of Evidence or
Procedure, the state supreme court could reject the applicability or validity of the legislation. There
are a few examples where the General Assembly has acted beyond the scope of its power and the
South Carolina Supreme Court has acted in response. For instance, South Carolina law defines the
"practice of engineering" to include "expert technical testimony," S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-22-20(23)
(Supp. 2009), and it also prohibits the practice of engineering without a South Carolina license, id.
§ 40-22-30(A)(1). However, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected a plain interpretation of the
statute because it is in contravention of Rule 702 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. Baggerly
v. CSX Transp., Inc., 370 S.C. 362, 374-75, 635 S.E.2d 97, 104 (2006) (permitting an engineer to
testify as an expert in her field, pursuant to Rule 702, even though the expert was not licensed in
South Carolina). Although the court did not expressly invalidate the statute, it essentially ignores the
plain meaning of the statute because it conflicted with Rule 702. See id. But see Stokes v. Denmark
Emergency Med. Servs., 315 S.C. 263, 267, 433 S.E.2d 850, 852 (1993) (noting the South Carolina
Constitution's "intent to subordinate to the General Assembly the Court's rulemaking power in
regard to practice and procedure").
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to Federal Rule 702.115 Significantly, the notes to the Amendments include a
provision explicitly incorporating the comments of Federal Rule 702.11' This
provision would have the effect of adopting Daubert's progeny: Kumho, Joiner,
and Weisgram.117 Furthermore, the Amendments would add a provision to the
state's rules of civil procedure for holding pretrial Daubert conferences, 118 as
well as a provision requiring litigants to submit a Daubert report to opposing
counsel and the court.
One positive effect that would be gained from the Amendments that was not
achieved by White II is the express adoption of Daubert and its progeny.120
Under the Amendments, these cases would have precedential value in South
Carolina state courts. Moreover, the proposed Amendments would also make
other federal courts' opinions interpreting the Daubert standard persuasive
authority in South Carolina courts. While this would not have any binding
precedential effect, state trial courts could rely heavily on federal authority as
they shape South Carolina's interpretation of the Daubert standard. This could
have a significant practical effect on South Carolina trial attorneys because the
Amendments would open up a significant body of case law for litigants to apply
in state courts. For instance, the Fourth Circuit has held that "[t]he court need not
115. S.C. R. EviD. 702 note (proposed 2008).
116. Id. ("The comments to the 2000 amendment to the federal rule are incorporated herein by
reference.").
117. The comments to Federal Rule 702 indicate that Daubert's progeny is correct and should
be followed. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (citing Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993))
(noting that Federal Rule 702 was amended in response to Daubert and cases interpreting it).
118. S.C. R. CIV. P. 16(d) (proposed 2008) ("Upon motion of a party, the court shall hold a
pretrial hearing to determine whether a witness qualifies as an expert and whether the expert's
testimony satisfies the requirements of Rule[] 702 ... ").
119. S.C. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(C) (proposed 2008) ("Whether or not a party elects to request a
pretrial hearing as contemplated in Rule 16(d), all parties shall disclose to other parties to the
litigation the identity of all persons who may be used at trial to present expert evidence. Except as
otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, this disclosure, with respect to a witness who is
retained to provide expert testimony at trial in the case.., must be accompanied by a written report
prepared and signed by the witness or by counsel for the party retaining that expert."). Opinion on
these Amendments to the state rules of civil procedure is mixed, and advocates on both sides of the
debate have strong arguments for their respective positions. Compare S.C. Judicial Dep't, supra
note 113 (comment of R. Bruce Shaw) (arguing that the proposed Amendments are important to
prevent "'trial by ambush"' and "will clarify the limits on expert testimony in the event of a trial"),
and id. (comment of Edward W. Laney, IV) (arguing that the proposed Amendments will lead to
greater judicial economy and assist litigants to understand expert opinions), with id. (comment of
William H. Ehlies, II) (arguing that the proposed Amendments will create an "insurmountable
hurdle" for certain litigants), and id. (comment of Joseph F. Rice) (arguing that the proposed
Amendments will simply make litigation "more time-consuming, delayed, and more expensive").
120. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
121. When construing rules of procedure that mirror the federal rules, South Carolina state
courts should look to federal case law as persuasive authority, particularly in instances where there
are no South Carolina state cases directly on point. See Gardner v. Newsome Chevrolet-Buick, Inc.,
304 S.C. 328, 330, 404 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1991).
2010]
15
Nash: Are We There Yet: Gatekeepers, Daubert, and an Analysis of State
Published by Scholar Commons, 2010
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
determine that the proffered expert testimony is irrefutable or certainly
correct., 122 Like the United States Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit has also
noted that "[a]s the gatekeeper, the district court should analyze the proposed
expert testimony using several factors" 123 and that the "factors identified in
Daubert 'do not constitute a definitive checklist or test."' 124 Finally, in some rare
instances, certain kinds of expert testimony can become so reliable that it can be
admitted subject to judicial notice.
1 25
South Carolina district court decisions on Daubert rulings would also
provide insight on facts and circumstances that are important in determining the
admissibility of an expert. For instance, in Trademark Properties, Inc. v. A & E
126Television Networks, the district court judge ruled that an expert's
methodology was unreliable and failed to satisfy any of the Daubert factors
because the expert relied solely on a New York Times chart and the Internet to127
calculate the plaintiffs claim for damages. In Morehouse v. Louisville Ladder
Group LLC, the judge excluded an expert's testimony as unreliable because he
did not employ the scientific method in his methodology and because the129
scientific community did not generally accept his hypothesis. The judge found
that the expert did not "reliably test[] his hypothesis" because the expert was
unable to state conclusively whether the ladder was altered before the plaintiff
was injured. 13 Furthermore, the judge found that the expert's hypothesis for why
the ladder caused the plaintiffs injury was "not even known" to the scientific
community and thus not generally accepted. 13 Thus, should the court adopt the
proposed Amendments, practioners in South Carolina state courts must
familiarize themselves with the federal courts' applications of Daubert because,
if nothing else, they will provide a wide factual basis to compare to a new case.
The proposed Amendments also provide a practical benefit not achieved by
the decision in White II. As mentioned previously, the Amendments include a
122. United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir. 2006).
123. Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 261 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993)).
124. Simo v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 245 F. App'x 295, 301 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999)).
125. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592
n. 11). Because South Carolina has an evidentiary rule allowing for judicial notice, this line of
Daubert, as interpreted by the Fourth Circuit in Crisp, would also apply. See S.C. R. EVID. 201.
126. No. 2:06-CV-2195-CWH, 2008 WL 4811461 (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 2008).
127. Id. at *2. The trial judge was also skeptical of the expert's use of the Internet to attain the
information. Id. n.2.
128. No. 3:03-887-22, 2004 WL 2431796 (D.S.C. June 28, 2004). The plaintiff's expert
intended to testify that a defective ladder that did not have enough overall strength caused the
plaintiff's injury. Id. at *2.
129. Id. at *5-7.
130. Id. at *5.
131. Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted). The expert had proffered a theory of
"spontaneous buckling" that purportedly caused the ladder to collapse and caused the plaintiff's
injury. Id. at *6.
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provision for holding pretrial Daubert conferences and a provision requirinq
litigants to submit a Daubert report to opposing counsel and to the court.
1
%
These changes to the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure would provide
practical benefits to practioners in state courts. First, the pretrial Daubert
conference would facilitate the trial judge's ability to make a ruling on the
admissibility of an expert witness before the trial begins. Second, upon making a
decision regarding the admissibility of an expert witness at a pretrial Daubert
conference, the trial court in its ruling would be required to "set forth the
findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the ruling to admit or
exclude expert evidence is based., 133 These written rulings would provide
insight and predictability regarding future trial court decisions on the
admissibility of expert witnesses. Third, the provision requiring litigants to
submit a Daubert report to opposing counsel and the court 34 would serve to
educate all parties and the court on the nature of an expert's testimony. 135 This
would assist both sides of the litigation and would also even the playing field by
requiring disclosure of the subject matter of the export's testimony,136 thuspreventing "trial by ambush." 137
VI. CONCLUSION
The South Carolina Supreme Court in White II has clarified the law
regarding the admissibility of expert witness testimony-that all expert witness
132. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
133. S.C. R. Civ. P. 16(d) (proposed 2008).
134. S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C) (proposed 2008).
135. See S.C. Judicial Dep't, supra note 113 (comment of Edward W. Laney, IV) (arguing that
the proposed Amendments will lead to greater judicial economy and assist litigants to understand
expert opinions); id. (comment of Daniel B. White) ("The adoption of [the proposed Amendments]
would offer trial judges greater guidance and clearly establish the judge's role as a gate-keeper in
ruling on the admissibility of proffered expert testimony.").
136. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C) (proposed 2008); S.C. Judicial Dep't, supra note 113
(comment of Thomas E. Dudley, III) (arguing that the Daubert report provision would "levell] the
playing field and reduce[] the game playing").
137. S.C. Judicial Dep't, supra note 113 (comment of R. Bruce Shaw) (arguing that the
proposed Amendments are important to prevent 'trial by ambush' and "will clarify the limits on
expert testimony in the event of a trial"). Opponents of the proposed Amendments argue that the
jury should ultimately decide the worthiness of expert testimony. See, e.g., id. (comment 1 of the
South Carolina Bar Practice and Procedure Committee) (arguing that the proposed Amendments
"take away from the province of the jury the ability to hear [expert] testimony and use their
judgment to weigh the evidence and creditability of this evidence"); id. (comment of Frederick I.
Hall, III) ("[V]igorous cross-examination and motions to exclude expert testimony based upon its
unreliability are the most appropriate ways to deal with an expert whose testimony may be
suspect."). However, these arguments run contrary to the fundamental premise of Daubert that a
jury should not even hear evidence if it is unreliable. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993) (emphasizing that the determination of reliability of an expert's testimony
is a "preliminary assessment"); S.C. Judicial Dep't, supra note 113 (comment of R. Bruce Shaw)
(arguing that cross-examination is "not an adequate substitute for an experienced trial judge to
determine the boundaries and... admissibility of expert evidence").
2010]
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testimony, both scientific and nonscientific, is subject to rigorous scrutiny to
ensure that such testimony is reliable pursuant to Rule 702 of the South Carolina
Rules of Evidence. Moreover, it emphasized the gatekeeping role of the trial
judge to assess the reliability of an expert witness's testimony. However, the
court should do more to ensure that trial courts can properly fulfill their
gatekeeping duties. To that extent, the South Carolina Supreme Court should
adopt the proposed Amendments, which would amend the South Carolina Rules
of Evidence and the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and bring South
Carolina state practice in line with federal practice. Such Amendments would
open up a rich body of case law that could be used as authority in state courts.
Moreover, the procedural mechanisms would ensure that all parties and the court
are fully abreast to the testimony of an expert witness. By providing procedural
mechanisms through which all parties and the court can become fully aware of
an expert witness's testimony before trial, the Amendments would serve to
increase fairness and predictability in South Carolina state court practice.
Mark R. Nash
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